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The Economics of Pollution Taxes
HOWARD GENSLER*
Pollution is an economic problem as well as an environmental
problem. In order for an economy to reach its full potential, that is,
to achieve an optimal level of production, there are three basic
features which its system of property rights must have: universality,
exclusivity, and transferability.' The first requirement, universality,
means that all valuable, scarce resources must be owned. Any re-
source which cannot be owned is unavailable, and, therefore, con-
strains the economy. The second requirement is exclusivity. If an
owner is unable to exclude others from the use and enjoyment of
the property, then the owner has no incentive to invest in the prop-
erty. The final requirement for an optimal economy is transferabili-
ty. Without transferability, resources cannot be reallocated to their
highest and best use.
Pollution is a violation of the exclusivity requirement. Someone
else is interfering with another's enjoyment of the land, water, or
air. A market burdened by pollution is out of equilibrium. The good
is over-produced and under-priced and a social welfare loss results.
The market can be put back into equilibrium through governmental
intervention by way of imposition of a tax on pollution. This article
reviews the economics of pollution in its various forms, beginning
with the simple case of nuisance, and building to an explication of
the remedial consequences of an enlightened system of taxation.
* Professor of Business Law and Taxation, The Hong Kong University of Science
and Technology; J.D., University of California at Berkley, 1983; M.A., Economics, 1992,
Ph.D., Economics, 1993, University of California at Irvine; B.A., Phi Beta Kappa, Eng-
lish, History, Philosophy, Political Science, Economics, University of California at Irvine.
' See RI -ARD A. PosNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS Or- LAw 32-34 (4th ed. 1992).
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I. NUISANCE
A nuisance is an identifiable interference by one person with
the enjoyment of another person's property.2 A nuisance may be
enjoined and may trigger damages. For instance, a new airport
opens and planes take off over a neighborhood. The airport is a
nuisance to the neighborhood as the noise of the planes taking off
disturbs the homeowners. The homeowners can collect damages or
possibly alter or close the airport's operations.
The economics of a nuisance situation can be understood in
light of the Coase Theorem,3 which states that the assignment of
liability will not alter economic behavior where negotiation costs are
low. To illustrate this concept, let us examine a paper mill and a
trout farmer who share a lake. The trout farmer harvests $100,000
of trout from his fishery each year. The paper mill begins operation
and grosses $500,000 each year. The paper mill dumps untreated
sewage into the lake on a regular basis in excess of the lake's abili-
ty to absorb the sewage. The trout farmer's revenues fall to $50,000
per year.
First, let us suppose that it costs $10,000 per year to treat the
sewage.4 What will the parties do? The paper mill will operate, the
trout farmer will fish, the sewage will be treated. We know all these
economic outcomes will occur without knowing whether or not the
paper mill is liable. Why? If the paper mill is liable, then it has
three choices:
1) Stop operating and not earn $500,000 per year.
2) Operate but pay the trout farmer $50,000 per year damages.
3) Operate but pay $10,000 per year to treat the sewage.
The third option obviously is the most profitable solution.
Now suppose that the paper mill is not liable. The trout farmer
has three choices:
1) Stop operating and not earn $50,000 per year.
2) Operate and earn $50,000 per year.
3) Operate, pay the $10,000 treatment expenses, and earn
$90,000 after treatment expenses.
See id. at 50; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1065 (6th ed. 1990).
R. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 44 (1960); see also
R. PINDYK & D. RUBWFELD, MICROECONOMICS 632, 634 (1989).
' Assuming that both parties know it will cost $10,000 to treat the pollution and
that the treatment is effective.
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Obviously, the sewage treatment option is the most profitable alter-
native. Economically, liability is irrelevant. The same productive
behavior occurs despite the placement of liability.
Now suppose that the sewage treatment expenses are $60,000
per year. Again, the same economic behavior will result despite the
placement of liability. Suppose the paper mill is liable. The paper
mill faces three choices:
1) Stop operating and not earn $500,000 per year.
2) Pay the trout farmer $50,000 and pollute, netting $450,000.
3) Pay $60,000 to treat the sewage, netting $440,000.
The paper mill will pollute and pay the trout farmer damages.
Now suppose the paper mill is not liable. The trout farmer
faces three choices:
1) Stop operating and not earn $50,000.
2) Operate and earn $50,000.
3) Pay $60,000 to treat the sewage, and net $40,000 after sew-
age treatment expenses.
Clearly, the trout farmer will ignore the pollution and continue to
operate. The same economic decisions result regardless of the place-
ment of liability.
II. POLLUTION
Unlike a classic nuisance situation, pollution is often a difficult
problem to handle on an individual, case-by-case basis because the
contribution from any one polluter is relatively negligible. The air
quality in a city will improve if everyone takes a bus to work. How-
ever, the air quality in a city won't improve if only one extra person
takes a bus to work today instead of driving a car. By the same
token, the air quality in a city won't degrade if the one extra person
drives a car today. The contribution to air pollution by one person is
too small to monitor and calculate. The transaction cost for identify-
ing any one person as a polluter, determining the amount which was
polluted, estimating the value of the damages from the marginal
contribution to pollution, and identifying and organizing the affected
individuals for the purpose of seeking compensation from each
specific polluter far exceeds the damage done by any specific pollut-
er. One of the requirements of the Coase Theorem is relatively
small transaction costs. Pollution is a social problem caused by the
collective and suffered by the community. That is why pollution
must be regulated at the public level. Enforcement of pollution rules
at the individual private level is inefficient.
1994-951
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Pollution is an externality. That is to say, pollution is a legiti-
mate expense of the production process which ought to be borne by
the manufacturer. The parties to the transaction do not face all the
costs because the manufacturer avoids the pollution clean-up costs.
These clean-up costs are, therefore, not reflected in the price of the
good. The total social expenses exceed the private purchase expens-
es. Because part of the costs are not internalized, there is over-pro-









Graph 1. Pollution as an Externality
In Graph 1, the manufacturer prices along the supply curve, S1.
The market price is determined by the intersection of demand and
supply at point C, with market quantity QM and market price Pm.
The cost of pollution, a constant increment per unit (BC), is created
by the manufacturer, suffered by society, and ignored by the con-
sumer. If the manufacturer paid to clean up the pollution, pricing
would be along supply curve S2. The market equilibrium would be
at point E, with equilibrium quantity QE and price P,. When the
manufacturer is allowed to shift private costs onto society, the good
is under-priced by amount PsP, and over-supplied by amount QMQE.
[VOL. 10:1
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A social welfare loss (SWL) of area A ABC is incurred.
I. POLLUTION TAXES
The problem of pollution, when understood as an externality,
lends itself to a swift and simple solution. The government should
impose a tax on goods which involve pollution. The tax revenue
could or could not be used to clean up the pollution. From an eco-
nomic standpoint, how the revenue is used is unimportant. Say the
producer created $1,000 of pollution, and the government raised
$1,000 in taxes. Society has been damaged $1,000 by pollution, but
society has been paid $1,000 in taxes in compensation for the dam-
age. Whether society chooses to use the $1,000 to clean up the
pollution or to build schools is irrelevant. The important aspect of
these taxes from an economic viewpoint is that the costs of produc-
tion have been internalized so that prices reflect true total social










Graph 2. Pollution Taxes
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In Graph 2, the producer produces along supply curve S1, pol-
luting a constant amount per unit BC as before. The total social cost
curve is supply curve S2. The market would clear at point C with
quantity sold Qf at price P,. However, the government imposes a
tax just equal to the amount of pollution, BC, raising the supply
curve to S,. The new supply curve, including the pollution tax,
reflects all the social costs of production. The appropriate equilibri-
um is reached at point E, with Q, units sold at price P,. The con-
sumer willingly pays the price of the good with the tax for a total
revenue amount of [] OPEEQE. The supplier receives revenue in the
amount of 0 OPDQE. The government collects tax revenues in the
amount of 0I PsPEED. There is no social welfare loss, nor over-
production. The market is operating efficiently, no longer
misallocating too many resources to the good in question.
IV. THE EcoNoMIcs OF POLLUTION
In the previous section, a tax was placed on the good, not on
the pollution. In many situations, that is all that can be done because
monitoring individual sources of pollution is too expensive or is
technically infeasible. In some situations, however, pollution can be
directly monitored. The economic consequences of these situations
are more sophisticated and more interesting.
Let us take, for example, a steel plant in a small town in a
remote part of Pennsylvania. The steel plant produces not only steel
but also gross amounts of air pollution. The steel plant is the only
significant source of pollution in the area. The steel plant can emit
great amounts of pollution with absolutely no harmful effect what-
soever, as the air pollution diffuses into the atmosphere harmlessly.
After a point, though, the environment is no longer able to absorb
the pollution. It has reached its natural saturation point. Additional
amounts of pollution are now detectable. At first the air pollution's
only detectable impact is visual. The air begins to discolor. This is
aesthetically unpleasant, but poses no health risk whatsoever. The
social costs of pollution have risen from zero to some small amount.
After a point, the pollution irritates the infirm, the aged, and the
very young. The social costs have risen to a larger amount. Next,
healthy adults suffer eye irritation. Then the weak have difficulty
breathing. Later, the strong have difficulty breathing. Eventually we
all start suffering severe health effects. The costs of pollution can be
graphed as an increasing cost curve over quantity, as in Graph 3.
[VOL. 10:1







Graph 3. Pollution Costs
Now suppose that pollution can be measured and that the
amount of pollution which the steel plant emits at full capacity of
production is 100 units of pollution with the associated costs indi-
cated in Graph 4. The costs can be in whatever units that are appro-
priate: thousands of dollars, millions of dollar, etc. For the sake of
simplicity, we will just refer to the costs in one dollar increments.
Notice that all the really harmful pollution is the last pollution emit-
ted. The first 30 units did not impose any costs at all on society. All
the pollution that caused over $4 of harm per unit was done by the
last 10 units. If society could get the steel plant to cut back just 10
units of pollution, then most of the harm would be avoided.
Now let us examine the costs of avoiding pollution. At first, it
is very cheap to avoid pollution. In fact, it is virtually costless. The
steel plant simply makes a conscious effort not to be wasteful. It
turns off lights not being used, does not run the air conditioning so
much, changes to energy efficient lights, recycles waste, encourages
car pooling. There are a lot of little things that can be done that do
not really cost anything. That does not solve the problem, however.
The plant might have to switch to cleaner burning fuels that may
cost significantly more. Then the plant buys scrubbers for its smoke-
stacks. After that, more energy efficient equipment must be pur-
1994-95]
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chased. The costs are becoming more and more significant. After a
point, it does not matter what the steel plant does, it cannot make
steel and not pollute. The price of pollution avoidance becomes
infinite. Graph 5 shows the costs associated with eliminating pollu-
tion. The first few units avoided are cheap and easy to do. The more
pollution is eliminated, the more expensive it becomes to eliminate
each successive unit of pollution. This is the marginal cost curve of
pollution avoidance.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
QUANTITY OF POLLUTION
Graph 4. An Example of Pollution Costs
Next we must determine the benefits of pollution avoidance.
The benefits of pollution avoidance are the costs of pollution which
are avoided. Accordingly, the benefit of pollution avoidance is sim-
ply the reverse (or mirror image) of the costs of pollution. The cost
of pollution in the steel plant example is Graph 4. The reverse of
Graph 4 is Graph 6.
Notice that the benefits of avoiding the first 10 units of pollu-
tion are very great. That is because it is the last 10 units of pollu-
tion which actually are being avoided. Pollution is reduced from the
top, like water from a bucket, not from the bottom. The next 20
units of pollution avoided are substantial. After that, the benefits of
[VOL. 10:1
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avoiding pollution are rather small. After avoiding 70 units of pollu-
tion, there are no benefits to further reductions in pollution. That is
because the first 30 units of pollution are harmless. This graph
illustrates the fact that even if all pollution could be eliminated, it
should not be avoided because it would be a waste of time and
resources. The question is, how much pollution should be avoided?
That can be determined by overlaying the marginal cost curve of
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Graph 6. The Benefits of Pollution Avoidance
Our steel plant example is illustrated in Graph 7. Here, society
would want the steel plant to avoid about 23 units of pollution. The
benefits from avoiding the pollution exceed the costs of avoiding
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the pollution up to 23 units of pollution avoided. Clean up costs
beyond 23 units of pollution exceed the benefits. It is inefficient to
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Graph 7. The Pollution Avoidance Market
Think of it this way. The marginal cost of pollution control at
the 23rd unit of pollution is about $2.30. Suppose society were
given a choice: either have the pollution beyond the 23rd unit
cleaned up or be paid $2.30 per unit of pollution. Society would
rather take the money. The benefits of cleaning the pollution up are
less than $2.30 per unit. It is better to get $2.30 per unit than less
than $2.30. This leads us to a theory for direct pollution taxes.
V. DIRECT POLLUTION TAXES
In a perfect world where everyone knew all relevant informa-
tion with absolute certainty, the government could require polluters
to clean up pollution where the benefit of pollution avoidance ex-
ceeded the costs and to pay a tax equal to the marginal benefit of
pollution avoidance where the cost of clean up exceeded the benefit.
Using the example above, exactly 23 units of pollution would be
cleaned up. As Graph 8 illustrates, under this perfectly precise tax
scheme, the firm would pay the amount A ABC in clean up costs.
Then the firm would pay a tax in the amount of A BCD exactly
equal to the marginal benefit of pollution avoidance beyond the
23rd unit of pollution.
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Graph 8. Pollution Avoidance and Taxes Under
Perfect Information
Unfortunately, we do not live in a perfect world and we do not
know all relevant things with absolute certainty. We do not know
the shapes and positions of the marginal benefit curve nor of the
marginal cost curve. What then is society to do? Fortunately we do
live in an adjustable world. The government can estimate what the
marginal costs and benefits are and then set a tax on pollution.
Industry either pollutes and pays the tax or spends the money to
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Graph 9. Firm Behavior Under Arbitrary Pollution Taxes
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The government sets a tax, say, at $2.50 per unit. The manu-
facturer either pays the tax or cleans up the pollution. The manufac-
turer will clean up or avoid pollution where it is cheap and easy to
do so. The manufacturer pays A ABC in clean up costs. Where it is
expensive to clean up, the manufacturer elects to pay the set tax.
The firm pays El BCDE in taxes. The manufacturer and the govern-
ment know how much tax is owed because air pollution can be
monitored and measured.
If the manufacturer makes a mistake and doesn't clean up
enough pollution, then it pays the tax which is higher than the
avoidance costs. The manufacturer will adjust its behavior in the
next period and clean up more pollution because that is cheaper than
paying the tax. If the manufacturer makes a mistake and cleans up
too much pollution relative to the tax rate, it will adjust its behavior,
suspending the more expensive clean up programs, electing to pay
the smaller tax. Perfect information is not required. Firms adjust
their behavior over time in reponse to clear economic signals in an
uncertain world.
If the government decides that more pollution needs to be
avoided, then it simply raises the tax. On the other hand, if industry
is paying substantial sums of money for trivial gains in pollution
avoidance, and pollution levels are low, then the government can
reduce the tax as appropriate. The important thing about direct pol-
lution taxes is that industry can elect to clean up pollution or pay
the tax. The marginal cost of a unit of pollution is defined and
understood. No one is spending billions of dollars to avoid non-
existent health risks. The strength of the taxation system is in the
explicit definition of costs imposed in combination with the flexibil-
ity of choice on the part of industry to minimize compliance costs
,given a realistic and objective value of pollution and pollution
avoidance.
CONCLUSION
Property law is simply a legal expression of the fundmental
economic requirements for an optimal economy. Pollution is a viola-
tion of an optimal economic system. Pollution controls, regulation,
and abatement generally promote efficiency and optimality. The
abatement of pollution, as any activity, can be pursued inefficiently.
By understanding the economics of pollution and pollution control,
society can achieve any desired level of pollution avoidance at the
least cost.
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